1
00:00:03,136 --> 00:00:04,871
Grab your ankles.
Head down.

2
00:00:05,672 --> 00:00:06,606
Man: Get out of it!

3
00:00:06,673 --> 00:00:08,341
Man: I can't.
Man: no!

4
00:00:08,408 --> 00:00:10,610
Man: Oh, God! That's it.

5
00:00:13,880 --> 00:00:17,650
Narrator: A plane crash
in Georgia leaves 23 dead,

6
00:00:17,717 --> 00:00:21,321
including a NASA astronaut
and a U.S. Senator.

7
00:00:21,721 --> 00:00:23,690
Man: Anytime there's
a high-profile case,

8
00:00:23,757 --> 00:00:26,826
there's more stress
and pressure on you.

9
00:00:26,893 --> 00:00:28,561
Narrator: In search
of the cause...

10
00:00:28,628 --> 00:00:30,563
Man: We've got to see
what happens in the air.

11
00:00:30,630 --> 00:00:32,499
Narrator: Investigator
Tom Haueter gambles

12
00:00:32,565 --> 00:00:34,167
on a risky hunch.

13
00:00:34,234 --> 00:00:36,336
Tom Haueter: When I first
proposed doing the flight test,

14
00:00:36,403 --> 00:00:38,671
it was not well-received.

15
00:00:38,738 --> 00:00:41,174
Narrator: He puts his reputation

16
00:00:41,241 --> 00:00:44,477
and the life of a skilled
test pilot on the line.

17
00:00:44,544 --> 00:00:45,945
Haueter: EMB-120, do you copy?

18
00:00:46,012 --> 00:00:47,147
Man: Copy.

19
00:00:47,781 --> 00:00:51,284
Man: This was, in my opinion,
a very dangerous maneuver.

20
00:00:51,351 --> 00:00:53,653
Haueter:
What if this airplane crashes?

21
00:00:53,720 --> 00:00:55,321
What if we lose the airplane?

22
00:00:55,922 --> 00:00:58,091
Man: The risks, of course,
is part of the game.

23
00:01:00,827 --> 00:01:02,128
Flight attendant:
Ladies and gentlemen,

24
00:01:02,195 --> 00:01:03,229
we are starting our approach.

25
00:01:03,296 --> 00:01:04,764
Pilot: We lost both engines!

26
00:01:04,831 --> 00:01:05,899
Flight attendant:
Put the mask over your nose.

27
00:01:05,965 --> 00:01:06,900
Emergency descent.

28
00:01:06,966 --> 00:01:08,268
Pilot: Mayday, mayday.

29
00:01:08,334 --> 00:01:09,369
Flight attendant:
Brace for impact!

30
00:01:09,436 --> 00:01:10,937
Controller: I think I lost one.

31
00:01:11,004 --> 00:01:13,440
Man: Investigation starting
into this tragedy...

32
00:01:13,506 --> 00:01:15,341
Man: He's gonna crash!

33
00:01:28,021 --> 00:01:31,624
Narrator: Atlantic Southeast
Airlines flight 2311

34
00:01:31,691 --> 00:01:33,827
cruises at 15,000 feet.

35
00:01:37,030 --> 00:01:39,232
Hank Johnston: It's the Braves'
year. I feel it.

36
00:01:39,299 --> 00:01:41,501
Mark Friedline: Sorry.
I don't want to get my hopes up.

37
00:01:41,568 --> 00:01:45,238
Last year still hurts.

38
00:01:45,305 --> 00:01:48,975
Narrator: At the controls
is Captain Mark Friedline.

39
00:01:49,042 --> 00:01:51,544
The 34-year-old is
an experienced pilot

40
00:01:51,611 --> 00:01:54,614
with almost 12,000 flight hours.

41
00:01:55,915 --> 00:01:57,917
Friedline: We got storm clouds
ahead of us.

42
00:01:57,984 --> 00:02:00,153
Johnston: Yep.
What do you want to do?

43
00:02:00,753 --> 00:02:03,189
Narrator: First officer
Hank Johnston is 36.

44
00:02:03,256 --> 00:02:05,658
He's been flying with
Atlantic Southeast Airlines

45
00:02:05,725 --> 00:02:08,461
for nearly three years.

46
00:02:09,662 --> 00:02:11,197
Friedline:
We're gonna go around 'em.

47
00:02:11,698 --> 00:02:14,200
Tell center we'll go right.

48
00:02:14,267 --> 00:02:15,969
Johnston: Center, ASA 2311.

49
00:02:16,035 --> 00:02:19,172
We'd like to request a deviation
for some weather.

50
00:02:19,739 --> 00:02:21,040
John Maris:
This was a normal day

51
00:02:21,107 --> 00:02:22,876
in the life of the crew.

52
00:02:22,942 --> 00:02:24,711
Nothing untoward had happened,

53
00:02:24,777 --> 00:02:26,479
and I doubt they were expecting
any difficulties

54
00:02:26,546 --> 00:02:27,814
with the flight.

55
00:02:27,881 --> 00:02:30,083
Controller: ASA 2311,
roger that.

56
00:02:30,149 --> 00:02:32,785
Weather deviation approved
at your discretions.

57
00:02:32,852 --> 00:02:34,287
Maintain current altitude.

58
00:02:35,121 --> 00:02:37,690
Johnston: Okay.
Thanks, center. 2311.

59
00:02:37,757 --> 00:02:40,960
Friedline: Let's go...
20 degrees to the right.

60
00:02:44,230 --> 00:02:46,165
Narrator: Today's flight
is a short commuter route

61
00:02:46,232 --> 00:02:47,767
from Atlanta, Georgia,

62
00:02:47,834 --> 00:02:50,503
to the city of Brunswick
on the Atlantic coast.

63
00:02:54,140 --> 00:02:56,142
Friedline: This is Captain
Friedline on the flight deck.

64
00:02:56,209 --> 00:02:58,111
We've got a bit of weather
ahead of us,

65
00:02:58,177 --> 00:03:00,713
but we're gonna go around it and
give you a pretty smooth ride.

66
00:03:00,780 --> 00:03:02,582
Might hit a few bumps,
but nothing to worry about.

67
00:03:02,649 --> 00:03:04,717
We do ask you to return
to your seats

68
00:03:04,784 --> 00:03:07,353
and please make sure your
safety belts are fastened.

69
00:03:12,892 --> 00:03:15,128
Narrator: The Embraer 120
banks gently

70
00:03:15,194 --> 00:03:18,231
as the pilots deviate
around the storm.

71
00:03:20,300 --> 00:03:21,701
Maris: The Embraer EMB-120

72
00:03:21,768 --> 00:03:24,203
is designed
for commuter-type operations.

73
00:03:24,270 --> 00:03:27,507
It takes approximately 30 people
on short haul flights

74
00:03:27,574 --> 00:03:30,176
between city centers.

75
00:03:30,243 --> 00:03:31,544
Narrator: The commuter airplane

76
00:03:31,611 --> 00:03:34,147
is powered
by two turboprop engines.

77
00:03:35,615 --> 00:03:37,917
Maris: Turboprops differ
from jet engines

78
00:03:37,984 --> 00:03:40,753
because instead of using the
exhaust to power the aircraft,

79
00:03:40,820 --> 00:03:42,889
they use a propeller,
which is more fuel-efficient

80
00:03:42,956 --> 00:03:46,926
and is more suited for
these smaller aircraft.

81
00:03:47,827 --> 00:03:49,996
Narrator: Today, there are
20 passengers aboard,

82
00:03:50,063 --> 00:03:52,966
including NASA Astronaut
Sonny Carter.

83
00:03:54,601 --> 00:03:56,502
Sonny Carter:
Thank you so much.

84
00:03:56,569 --> 00:03:58,438
You're a star.

85
00:03:58,871 --> 00:04:01,341
Narrator: As part of the space
shuttle Discovery's crew,

86
00:04:01,407 --> 00:04:04,911
Sonny Carter orbited the Earth
for 120 hours,

87
00:04:04,978 --> 00:04:08,548
circling the planet 79 times.

88
00:04:09,983 --> 00:04:13,753
Frederick Gregory served
with Carter on that mission.

89
00:04:13,820 --> 00:04:15,421
Fred Gregory: Sonny was
not only an astronaut;

90
00:04:15,488 --> 00:04:17,256
he was a renaissance man.

91
00:04:17,323 --> 00:04:20,693
He was an engineer,
he was a medical doctor,

92
00:04:20,760 --> 00:04:23,696
he was a navy pilot.

93
00:04:23,763 --> 00:04:26,699
At a very young age,
he had accomplished things

94
00:04:26,766 --> 00:04:28,334
that even one of which
would have been

95
00:04:28,401 --> 00:04:33,373
an outstanding achievement
for just any other person.

96
00:04:33,439 --> 00:04:36,676
Narrator: Also on the flight is
another high-profile figure,

97
00:04:36,743 --> 00:04:39,245
former Senator John Tower.

98
00:04:40,747 --> 00:04:43,650
Tower served four terms
in the U.S. Senate.

99
00:04:44,217 --> 00:04:46,052
A leading republican,
he was an advisor

100
00:04:46,119 --> 00:04:50,556
to presidents Ronald Reagan
and George H.W. Bush.

101
00:04:52,759 --> 00:04:55,428
Friedline: We're still running
20 minutes late.

102
00:04:55,495 --> 00:04:57,330
Johnston: Yep. Well...

103
00:04:57,730 --> 00:04:59,465
Friedline: Couldn't be helped.

104
00:05:00,333 --> 00:05:03,436
Narrator: Before takeoff,
flight 2311 was delayed

105
00:05:03,503 --> 00:05:05,638
due to a mechanical problem.

106
00:05:06,606 --> 00:05:09,442
The crew was forced
to switch planes.

107
00:05:10,243 --> 00:05:13,246
Maris: There was a last-minute
change in the aircraft,

108
00:05:13,312 --> 00:05:15,548
which, while uncommon,
is not extraordinary,

109
00:05:15,615 --> 00:05:18,918
and it would not have
thrown the crew.

110
00:05:22,922 --> 00:05:26,592
Carter: These small planes
do keep you on your toes.

111
00:05:28,294 --> 00:05:29,829
Narrator: The new plane
is running smoothly

112
00:05:29,896 --> 00:05:31,864
as it leaves
the storm clouds behind

113
00:05:31,931 --> 00:05:34,067
and nears its destination.

114
00:05:37,603 --> 00:05:42,141
Glynco Airport is a former
air base with just one runway.

115
00:05:42,208 --> 00:05:45,545
It's used by private planes
and small commuter airlines

116
00:05:45,611 --> 00:05:47,847
flying to the Georgia coast.

117
00:05:49,449 --> 00:05:52,618
The flight attendant prepares
the cabin for landing.

118
00:05:54,153 --> 00:05:56,656
Friedline:
The runway's in sight.

119
00:05:57,190 --> 00:06:00,426
Narrator: The crew is just
five minutes from touching down.

120
00:06:01,227 --> 00:06:05,631
Controller: ASA 2311,
cleared direct to Jeff-1 Glynco.

121
00:06:05,698 --> 00:06:08,768
Report the airport in sight.
Expect a visual.

122
00:06:08,835 --> 00:06:11,504
Johnston: We do have it
in sight, 2311.

123
00:06:12,138 --> 00:06:14,240
Friedline: Slowing
for approach speed.

124
00:06:15,775 --> 00:06:16,943
Maris: The aircraft was normal.

125
00:06:17,009 --> 00:06:19,545
There was nothing unexpected.

126
00:06:19,612 --> 00:06:20,980
Friedline: Gear down.

127
00:06:23,549 --> 00:06:24,784
Johnston: Gear down.

128
00:06:25,785 --> 00:06:27,253
Three green.

129
00:06:30,056 --> 00:06:32,792
Narrator: Then, the captain
notices an unusual sound.

130
00:06:34,761 --> 00:06:36,629
Friedline: That's weird.

131
00:06:36,696 --> 00:06:39,432
Number one seems to be
spinning faster.

132
00:06:39,499 --> 00:06:44,403
The left is... the left is
pulling a bit more.

133
00:06:44,470 --> 00:06:47,073
Bringing power down to the left.

134
00:06:47,140 --> 00:06:49,442
Narrator: Captain Friedline
tries to compensate

135
00:06:49,509 --> 00:06:52,745
for the plane's unexplained
pull to the left.

136
00:06:54,514 --> 00:06:59,018
Flight 2311 is less than
1,000 feet from the ground,

137
00:06:59,552 --> 00:07:02,755
and the plane is getting more
and more difficult to control.

138
00:07:06,592 --> 00:07:07,727
Friedline: What's going on?

139
00:07:07,794 --> 00:07:09,295
You see anything?

140
00:07:10,196 --> 00:07:11,998
Johnston: There's nothing.

141
00:07:12,064 --> 00:07:13,666
Maris: The crew were apparently
caught completely by surprise

142
00:07:13,733 --> 00:07:15,067
by something.

143
00:07:15,134 --> 00:07:16,169
Friedline: What's going on
with this thing?

144
00:07:16,235 --> 00:07:17,270
I can't hold it.

145
00:07:17,336 --> 00:07:18,604
Johnston: Get out of it!

146
00:07:18,671 --> 00:07:20,473
Friedline:
I can't. Come on!

147
00:07:22,008 --> 00:07:24,443
Narrator: The plane
is rolling to the left,

148
00:07:24,510 --> 00:07:27,113
and the crew doesn't know why.

149
00:07:27,947 --> 00:07:29,982
Maris: The crew would have
instinctively applied

150
00:07:30,049 --> 00:07:32,919
opposite aileron, moving
the stick to the right,

151
00:07:32,985 --> 00:07:34,954
to try and prevent the aircraft
from rolling as it was.

152
00:07:38,591 --> 00:07:41,527
Carter: Come on, guys.

153
00:07:41,594 --> 00:07:42,995
Get us out of this.

154
00:07:43,062 --> 00:07:45,331
Johnston:
Come on! God. I can't.

155
00:07:45,398 --> 00:07:46,899
Computer: pull up.

156
00:07:46,966 --> 00:07:49,001
Maris: I think they would
have been preoccupied

157
00:07:49,068 --> 00:07:51,671
with trying to stop the roll,

158
00:07:51,737 --> 00:07:53,172
maybe to the extent
of not knowing

159
00:07:53,239 --> 00:07:55,775
just how much peril
they were in.

160
00:07:57,910 --> 00:07:59,111
Carter: Do what I do.

161
00:07:59,178 --> 00:08:01,447
Grab your ankles,
head down. Okay?

162
00:08:03,416 --> 00:08:05,017
Narrator: Captain Friedline
fights desperately

163
00:08:05,084 --> 00:08:06,552
to save his plane.

164
00:08:06,619 --> 00:08:07,720
Computer: Pull up.

165
00:08:08,054 --> 00:08:10,223
Friedline: Come on!
Johnston: No! No!

166
00:08:10,289 --> 00:08:13,326
Friedline:
That's it. Oh, God!

167
00:08:13,392 --> 00:08:15,228
Narrator: It's no use.

168
00:08:19,732 --> 00:08:22,335
Maris: The aircraft crashed
in the middle of woods,

169
00:08:22,401 --> 00:08:24,437
which would have made the job
of the first responders

170
00:08:24,503 --> 00:08:27,907
and firefighting teams
quite difficult.

171
00:08:29,475 --> 00:08:32,979
Narrator: Rescuers make their
way through the dense brush,

172
00:08:33,045 --> 00:08:35,248
but when they reach
the crash site,

173
00:08:35,314 --> 00:08:38,150
they find no one alive
to rescue.

174
00:08:39,318 --> 00:08:43,055
All 20 passengers and
three crewmembers are dead,

175
00:08:43,122 --> 00:08:45,524
killed at the moment of impact.

176
00:08:47,627 --> 00:08:49,095
Jim Ritter: It was
a catastrophic crash.

177
00:08:49,161 --> 00:08:51,831
There was no chance
for survival.

178
00:08:53,232 --> 00:08:56,235
Narrator: With two high-profile
passengers on board,

179
00:08:56,302 --> 00:09:00,273
the crash of flight 2311 makes
headlines around the world.

180
00:09:03,376 --> 00:09:05,211
Maris:
In this particular accident,

181
00:09:05,278 --> 00:09:09,215
Senator Tower on board, was
a four-term senator, was killed,

182
00:09:09,282 --> 00:09:12,084
which raised the profile
of the accident a great deal,

183
00:09:12,151 --> 00:09:13,653
both from the investigation
point of view

184
00:09:13,719 --> 00:09:15,922
and the public and the media.

185
00:09:15,988 --> 00:09:17,657
Woman: And we are,
at this moment,

186
00:09:17,723 --> 00:09:21,294
beginning the on-scene phases
of the investigation.

187
00:09:22,028 --> 00:09:27,133
Gregory: I was in Spain
when the accident occurred.

188
00:09:27,199 --> 00:09:29,535
When I got on the plane
to head back,

189
00:09:29,602 --> 00:09:33,839
the pilot told me that one of
the astronauts had been killed,

190
00:09:33,906 --> 00:09:36,242
and that his name was Carter.

191
00:09:36,943 --> 00:09:40,279
I was in shock,
because Sonny and I had

192
00:09:40,346 --> 00:09:44,517
had an amazing
relationship for years.

193
00:09:44,583 --> 00:09:46,218
We were like brothers.

194
00:09:51,590 --> 00:09:53,125
Narrator:
Wreckage is still smoldering

195
00:09:53,192 --> 00:09:55,962
when Jim Ritter arrives
at the crash site.

196
00:09:57,964 --> 00:09:59,966
Though an experienced
investigator

197
00:10:00,032 --> 00:10:02,134
with the national transportation
safety board,

198
00:10:02,201 --> 00:10:05,304
Ritter is struck
by what he sees.

199
00:10:05,571 --> 00:10:06,906
Ritter: My God.

200
00:10:09,041 --> 00:10:11,377
There was a lot of fire damage
in the wreckage,

201
00:10:11,444 --> 00:10:15,448
and the airplane was basically
totally destroyed.

202
00:10:17,049 --> 00:10:18,684
Narrator: Ritter realizes
he's facing

203
00:10:18,751 --> 00:10:21,287
one of the biggest challenges
of his career.

204
00:10:22,088 --> 00:10:24,724
Ritter: Anytime there's
a high-profile case,

205
00:10:24,790 --> 00:10:26,192
you're a little more nervous.

206
00:10:26,258 --> 00:10:28,627
There's more stress
and pressure on you

207
00:10:28,694 --> 00:10:32,865
to come up with a cause
for the accident.

208
00:10:32,932 --> 00:10:35,634
Narrator: The pressure is on
to figure out what happened

209
00:10:35,701 --> 00:10:37,670
aboard flight 2311.

210
00:10:48,447 --> 00:10:49,882
Narrator:
In Glynn county, Georgia,

211
00:10:49,949 --> 00:10:51,784
investigators search for answers

212
00:10:51,851 --> 00:10:55,154
at the crash site
of flight 2311.

213
00:10:55,788 --> 00:10:57,656
Several people
at a nearby trailer park

214
00:10:57,723 --> 00:10:59,558
saw the plane go down.

215
00:11:00,659 --> 00:11:02,495
Man: It had come right over
top of the house,

216
00:11:02,561 --> 00:11:03,996
and it got real loud.

217
00:11:04,063 --> 00:11:06,499
It was coming right over
these trees here,

218
00:11:06,565 --> 00:11:09,668
and then it got extra loud.

219
00:11:11,404 --> 00:11:14,673
Ritter: The eyewitnesses saw
an extreme left roll angle

220
00:11:14,740 --> 00:11:16,409
from the airplane,

221
00:11:16,475 --> 00:11:19,779
and so we knew that it was some
kind of catastrophic failure,

222
00:11:19,845 --> 00:11:23,182
a very abrupt failure that
would have been difficult

223
00:11:23,249 --> 00:11:25,651
for the flight crew to overcome.

224
00:11:26,519 --> 00:11:28,087
Okay.

225
00:11:28,154 --> 00:11:30,222
Let's start here and work
backwards to first impact.

226
00:11:30,289 --> 00:11:31,924
I want a record of everything.

227
00:11:32,758 --> 00:11:34,093
You need to look
at the crash site

228
00:11:34,160 --> 00:11:36,362
to collect
the physical evidence.

229
00:11:36,429 --> 00:11:38,597
That's the most important aspect

230
00:11:38,664 --> 00:11:42,835
of any aircraft investigation.

231
00:11:42,902 --> 00:11:44,537
Maris: Investigators
look at the wreckage

232
00:11:44,603 --> 00:11:47,940
to try and evaluate the sequence
of events leading to the crash.

233
00:11:48,007 --> 00:11:50,209
They look for the two wing tips,
the tip of the tail,

234
00:11:50,276 --> 00:11:51,877
the tip of the nose.

235
00:11:53,312 --> 00:11:55,748
Narrator: A survey of
the crash site soon confirms

236
00:11:55,815 --> 00:12:00,086
those key pieces are
among the wreckage.

237
00:12:00,152 --> 00:12:02,922
Ritter: That tells us that there
was no in-flight breakup

238
00:12:02,988 --> 00:12:05,658
and that the airplane
stayed intact

239
00:12:05,724 --> 00:12:08,227
until it collided
with the ground.

240
00:12:09,762 --> 00:12:12,064
Can you get a shot of this wing
for me, please?

241
00:12:12,131 --> 00:12:13,933
Narrator:
For expert investigators,

242
00:12:13,999 --> 00:12:18,170
the size and shape of
the impact zone is also a clue.

243
00:12:20,306 --> 00:12:21,874
Maris: If an aircraft,
particularly through trees,

244
00:12:21,941 --> 00:12:24,543
has a long swathe
cut through the trees,

245
00:12:24,610 --> 00:12:27,546
the investigators get an idea
that the aircraft hit the ground

246
00:12:27,613 --> 00:12:30,549
approximately flat
in a shallow descent.

247
00:12:31,183 --> 00:12:32,952
In this case, the wreckage
was very concentrated,

248
00:12:33,018 --> 00:12:34,887
which indicated the aircraft
hit the ground

249
00:12:34,954 --> 00:12:37,690
at a very steep angle.

250
00:12:38,290 --> 00:12:40,759
Ritter: We need to get some

251
00:12:38,290 --> 00:12:40,759
measurements on these trees.

252
00:12:41,961 --> 00:12:44,563
Narrator: Investigators hope
the broken trees will shed light

253
00:12:44,630 --> 00:12:48,667
on witness statements about
the way the plane was flying.

254
00:12:48,734 --> 00:12:51,137
Man: I seen it fly overhead
and, you know,

255
00:12:51,203 --> 00:12:53,005
it looked like it was making
a wide right turn,

256
00:12:53,072 --> 00:12:55,941
but it was unusual because
when it turned out,

257
00:12:56,008 --> 00:12:58,277
it... the nose started heading
toward the ground,

258
00:12:58,344 --> 00:13:01,313
and I was right up toward
the entrance of touchstone,

259
00:13:01,380 --> 00:13:04,650
and I heard the explosion and
seen the fire and the smoke.

260
00:13:06,685 --> 00:13:08,354
Ritter: When the plane crashed,

261
00:13:08,420 --> 00:13:12,224
it sheared the tops off of many
of the trees in the woods there,

262
00:13:12,291 --> 00:13:14,660
and so one of the things
that we did

263
00:13:14,727 --> 00:13:16,729
was we measured the heights
of the trees

264
00:13:16,795 --> 00:13:18,697
where the tops were sheared off,

265
00:13:18,764 --> 00:13:21,300
and that was able to give us
a fairly good idea

266
00:13:21,367 --> 00:13:25,638
of the roll angle,
which was a large left roll.

267
00:13:28,474 --> 00:13:30,876
In the plane you would have
felt light in your seat.

268
00:13:30,943 --> 00:13:33,279
You would have turned
obviously to the left

269
00:13:33,345 --> 00:13:34,647
at almost 90 degrees.

270
00:13:34,713 --> 00:13:35,748
Johnston: Get out of it!

271
00:13:35,814 --> 00:13:37,816
Friedline: I can't. Come on!

272
00:13:37,883 --> 00:13:40,252
Ritter: It would have been
a traumatic experience.

273
00:13:40,319 --> 00:13:42,755
Carter: Come on, guys.

274
00:13:42,821 --> 00:13:44,790
Get us out of this.

275
00:13:49,995 --> 00:13:52,264
Ritter: What could
make it roll so far over?

276
00:13:53,065 --> 00:13:54,667
When the airplane rolled
to the left,

277
00:13:54,733 --> 00:13:57,770
it could really only be
due to two things.

278
00:13:57,836 --> 00:14:00,272
Perhaps the pilot wanted
to roll to the left,

279
00:14:00,339 --> 00:14:04,577
or there was a malfunction that
the pilots couldn't counteract.

280
00:14:05,077 --> 00:14:06,512
What have you got for me?

281
00:14:07,546 --> 00:14:09,815
Narrator: Ritter examines

282
00:14:07,546 --> 00:14:09,815
airport flight records.

283
00:14:10,516 --> 00:14:12,685
He's looking for anything
that might have triggered

284
00:14:12,751 --> 00:14:14,820
the deadly roll.

285
00:14:14,887 --> 00:14:16,689
Ritter: Clear skies on approach.

286
00:14:16,755 --> 00:14:18,390
Almost zero traffic.

287
00:14:19,325 --> 00:14:23,028
There were no other airplanes
in the area to avoid.

288
00:14:23,095 --> 00:14:25,130
It was a nice, clear day,

289
00:14:25,197 --> 00:14:27,399
so we didn't really
have an explanation

290
00:14:27,466 --> 00:14:30,769
for why the airplane rolled
so violently to the left.

291
00:14:32,271 --> 00:14:34,006
Narrator: Ritter won't be
getting an explanation

292
00:14:34,073 --> 00:14:36,442
from any onboard
flight recorders.

293
00:14:36,508 --> 00:14:37,977
At the time of the crash,

294
00:14:38,043 --> 00:14:40,813
commuter planes weren't
required to carry them.

295
00:14:41,480 --> 00:14:45,784
Investigators will have to solve
the mystery of flight 2311

296
00:14:45,851 --> 00:14:48,520
without one of their
most useful tools.

297
00:14:48,587 --> 00:14:51,724
Ritter: Not having those
made the physical evidence

298
00:14:51,790 --> 00:14:53,225
all the more important.

299
00:14:54,126 --> 00:14:55,294
What have you got for me?

300
00:14:56,495 --> 00:14:58,330
This is the third one.

301
00:14:58,397 --> 00:15:02,167
Narrator: The engines have been
badly damaged in the crash.

302
00:15:02,234 --> 00:15:04,870
The propeller blades
have been torn off.

303
00:15:05,971 --> 00:15:09,975
Did flight 2311 suffer
some kind of engine failure?

304
00:15:10,042 --> 00:15:12,845
It's too soon to say.

305
00:15:14,613 --> 00:15:16,115
One thing Ritter does know

306
00:15:16,181 --> 00:15:18,751
is that the pressure
he's feeling from the media

307
00:15:18,817 --> 00:15:20,252
is not about to let up.

308
00:15:22,021 --> 00:15:25,190
The deaths of Senator Tower
and Astronaut Sonny Carter

309
00:15:25,257 --> 00:15:27,926
are sure to keep the
investigation in the spotlight.

310
00:15:29,061 --> 00:15:32,431
Ritter is determined not to let
the pressure get to him.

311
00:15:33,866 --> 00:15:35,534
Ritter: Sometimes
we feel pressure

312
00:15:35,601 --> 00:15:37,303
to do an investigation quickly,

313
00:15:37,369 --> 00:15:41,974
but for the most part, it's
more important to get it right,

314
00:15:42,041 --> 00:15:44,176
and so I would rather
take the time

315
00:15:44,243 --> 00:15:46,312
and have a good analysis
of the evidence

316
00:15:46,378 --> 00:15:48,747
before they come out
with a probable cause.

317
00:15:49,682 --> 00:15:52,951
We won't find our answers here.

318
00:15:53,018 --> 00:15:55,187
Let's get what we can
back to the hangar--

319
00:15:55,254 --> 00:15:59,024
wings, tail, engines,
instruments.

320
00:15:59,091 --> 00:16:00,793
Narrator: The question now--

321
00:16:00,859 --> 00:16:02,761
can he find enough evidence

322
00:16:02,828 --> 00:16:05,397
to solve the mystery
of flight 2311?

323
00:16:14,940 --> 00:16:17,543
Narrator: Investigators begin
the painstaking task

324
00:16:17,609 --> 00:16:20,646
of sorting through the wreckage
of flight 2311.

325
00:16:21,814 --> 00:16:24,717
They're searching for
any evidence that might hint

326
00:16:24,783 --> 00:16:28,721
at why the Embraer 120 rolled
sharply to the left and crashed,

327
00:16:28,787 --> 00:16:30,989
killing everyone on board.

328
00:16:32,391 --> 00:16:33,659
Ritter: Alright, guys.

329
00:16:33,726 --> 00:16:35,494
Let's start with the ailerons.

330
00:16:35,561 --> 00:16:36,929
Narrator: They wonder
if one of the plane's

331
00:16:36,995 --> 00:16:39,798
flight control surfaces
was malfunctioning.

332
00:16:41,600 --> 00:16:44,169
Maris: Control surfaces
are the moveable flaps

333
00:16:44,236 --> 00:16:47,740
typically at the back of the
wings, the tail, and the fin,

334
00:16:47,806 --> 00:16:50,042
which allow the pilot
to roll the aircraft,

335
00:16:50,109 --> 00:16:52,411
to pitch the aircraft,
and to yaw the aircraft--

336
00:16:52,478 --> 00:16:55,581
the three motions
an aircraft can do.

337
00:16:56,548 --> 00:16:58,016
Narrator: They need to examine

338
00:16:58,083 --> 00:17:00,219
every component
of the flight control system.

339
00:17:01,320 --> 00:17:04,156
Ritter: What you're looking for
is continuity of the controls.

340
00:17:04,223 --> 00:17:07,593
Are the hinges all intact?

341
00:17:07,659 --> 00:17:10,662
All the actuators are
in their proper position?

342
00:17:10,729 --> 00:17:12,564
Were the control surfaces
themselves

343
00:17:12,631 --> 00:17:15,934
in a reasonable position
at the time of impact?

344
00:17:18,670 --> 00:17:20,406
Ailerons look good.

345
00:17:20,472 --> 00:17:22,241
When we examined
the control surfaces,

346
00:17:22,307 --> 00:17:24,243
we didn't find anything
unusual at all.

347
00:17:24,309 --> 00:17:26,712
Everything checked out normally.

348
00:17:29,615 --> 00:17:32,618
So if the control systems
were all working,

349
00:17:32,684 --> 00:17:34,620
why would a plane do this?

350
00:17:35,654 --> 00:17:38,657
Left bank almost 90 degrees,

351
00:17:38,724 --> 00:17:41,427
then almost straight down.

352
00:17:45,464 --> 00:17:47,699
Maybe the engine?

353
00:17:47,766 --> 00:17:49,635
Without the black boxes,

354
00:17:49,701 --> 00:17:52,337
it's basically a process
of elimination.

355
00:17:52,404 --> 00:17:54,807
We analyze all
of the physical evidence

356
00:17:54,873 --> 00:17:56,742
and come up with
the most compelling scenario

357
00:17:56,809 --> 00:17:59,445
that matches that evidence.

358
00:17:59,511 --> 00:18:02,080
Alright. Let's see what
we can find in here.

359
00:18:03,816 --> 00:18:07,019
Narrator: If one of the plane's
two turboprop engines failed,

360
00:18:07,085 --> 00:18:10,622
it might explain why the plane
went into such a steep roll.

361
00:18:12,357 --> 00:18:15,093
Ritter: We wanted to look
for any indications

362
00:18:15,160 --> 00:18:16,829
of an engine problem,

363
00:18:16,895 --> 00:18:19,598
so we retrieved both the left
and the right engine

364
00:18:19,665 --> 00:18:20,999
and their propeller systems

365
00:18:21,066 --> 00:18:22,534
and took those back
to the laboratory

366
00:18:22,601 --> 00:18:24,903
for further examination.

367
00:18:26,572 --> 00:18:30,609
Narrator: Investigators soon
find some telltale evidence--

368
00:18:30,676 --> 00:18:33,946
leaves and branches
inside the engines.

369
00:18:34,813 --> 00:18:36,515
Ritter: When we find vegetation
in the engines,

370
00:18:36,582 --> 00:18:38,851
that tells us that
the engine is operating

371
00:18:38,917 --> 00:18:41,620
because it's sucking in air

372
00:18:41,687 --> 00:18:44,223
and it's pulling in the leaves
and the vegetation,

373
00:18:44,289 --> 00:18:47,359
and that's an indication
that it's making power.

374
00:18:47,426 --> 00:18:49,228
This one was spinning
to the very end,

375
00:18:49,294 --> 00:18:50,829
no doubt about it.

376
00:18:51,730 --> 00:18:54,867
We confirmed that both engines
were operating

377
00:18:54,933 --> 00:18:56,735
right up until
the moment of impact.

378
00:18:56,802 --> 00:18:58,070
Computer: Terrain.

379
00:18:58,136 --> 00:18:59,705
Friedline: That's it.

380
00:19:01,306 --> 00:19:02,774
No!

381
00:19:08,013 --> 00:19:10,282
Narrator:
With engine failure ruled out,

382
00:19:10,349 --> 00:19:12,017
Ritter turns his attention

383
00:19:12,084 --> 00:19:15,721
to the other main part of
the plane's propulsion system.

384
00:19:15,787 --> 00:19:18,457
Ritter: Let's take a look
at these propellers.

385
00:19:18,524 --> 00:19:19,791
Thank you.

386
00:19:20,325 --> 00:19:23,495
Narrator: Tom Haueter
is an NTSB investigator.

387
00:19:23,562 --> 00:19:26,198
Haueter: When we started doing
testing of the propeller system,

388
00:19:26,265 --> 00:19:28,133
we didn't know where
it was gonna lead us,

389
00:19:28,200 --> 00:19:31,136
but it was something we had to
eliminate, if nothing else.

390
00:19:32,771 --> 00:19:34,640
Narrator: Deep inside
the propeller unit,

391
00:19:34,973 --> 00:19:38,577
investigators uncover
an important clue.

392
00:19:38,644 --> 00:19:40,579
Ritter: Ah-ha!

393
00:19:40,646 --> 00:19:42,514
There you are.

394
00:19:42,581 --> 00:19:43,515
We have a witness mark.

395
00:19:43,582 --> 00:19:45,684
Take a look.

396
00:19:45,751 --> 00:19:47,185
Narrator: There's a small mark

397
00:19:47,252 --> 00:19:48,954
where two parts
of the propeller mechanism

398
00:19:49,021 --> 00:19:53,058
slammed together on impact.

399
00:19:53,125 --> 00:19:56,562
The witness mark might be enough
to tell investigators

400
00:19:56,628 --> 00:19:59,064
how the propellers
were operating.

401
00:19:59,131 --> 00:20:03,068
Ritter: You can literally
match up the scratch marks

402
00:20:03,135 --> 00:20:04,937
between both pieces,

403
00:20:05,003 --> 00:20:08,140
and you'll know what the angle
of the propeller blade was

404
00:20:08,206 --> 00:20:10,142
from that measurement.

405
00:20:10,208 --> 00:20:11,910
Mark this one...

406
00:20:13,745 --> 00:20:15,881
22 degrees.

407
00:20:17,716 --> 00:20:19,585
Narrator: The Embraer 120
has what's called

408
00:20:19,651 --> 00:20:21,987
a constant speed propeller.

409
00:20:23,255 --> 00:20:26,491
The blades spin
at a steady rate in flight.

410
00:20:27,159 --> 00:20:30,162
When the pilots need more power,
the blades twist,

411
00:20:30,228 --> 00:20:33,298
changing their angle to take
a bigger bite out of the air

412
00:20:33,365 --> 00:20:37,202
and provide more thrust.

413
00:20:37,269 --> 00:20:39,605
Friedline:
Slowing for approach speed.

414
00:20:40,839 --> 00:20:42,341
Maris: And in flight,

415
00:20:42,407 --> 00:20:45,377
it acts like the automatic
transmission in a car.

416
00:20:45,444 --> 00:20:47,980
It's as if it's changing gears
to match the engine load,

417
00:20:48,046 --> 00:20:50,983
the speed, whether the plane
is climbing or descending,

418
00:20:51,049 --> 00:20:53,051
and it does so constantly
and automatically

419
00:20:53,118 --> 00:20:55,187
without intervention
by the crew.

420
00:20:58,390 --> 00:21:02,260
Narrator: There are witness
marks inside both propellers.

421
00:21:03,562 --> 00:21:06,565
Ritter: Now, this one...

422
00:21:06,632 --> 00:21:09,267
Looks like three degrees?

423
00:21:10,469 --> 00:21:13,238
Narrator: The marks tell Ritter
the exact angle of the blades

424
00:21:13,305 --> 00:21:16,341
when the plane slammed
into the ground.

425
00:21:16,408 --> 00:21:19,211
Ritter: We immediately
noticed the difference

426
00:21:19,277 --> 00:21:21,213
between some of the blade
angle measurements

427
00:21:21,279 --> 00:21:25,017
for the left engine
versus the right engine.

428
00:21:25,083 --> 00:21:28,020
These guys had a big problem
with their left propeller.

429
00:21:31,823 --> 00:21:34,660
The blades were almost flat.

430
00:21:36,094 --> 00:21:38,363
Narrator: The left side
propeller blades

431
00:21:38,430 --> 00:21:40,565
are at a dangerously low angle--

432
00:21:40,632 --> 00:21:43,802
one that is never used
during flight.

433
00:21:43,869 --> 00:21:46,705
At three degrees,
the blades are so flat,

434
00:21:46,772 --> 00:21:48,607
they would act like a wall,

435
00:21:48,674 --> 00:21:52,411
blocking the flow of air the
plane needs to maintain lift.

436
00:21:52,477 --> 00:21:55,647
Haueter: At certain speeds
and certain regimes of flight,

437
00:21:55,714 --> 00:21:57,649
if the propeller
goes flat enough,

438
00:21:57,716 --> 00:22:00,819
you have a situation where
you can't control the airplane.

439
00:22:05,223 --> 00:22:07,059
Narrator: Investigators
study the mechanism

440
00:22:07,125 --> 00:22:10,362
used to control
the left propeller.

441
00:22:10,429 --> 00:22:12,197
Ritter: Will you look at this?

442
00:22:14,132 --> 00:22:16,234
Narrator: They make
a disturbing discovery.

443
00:22:16,301 --> 00:22:18,270
Ritter:
It's completely worn down.

444
00:22:18,336 --> 00:22:20,772
Narrator: The teeth on a key
piece of the gear mechanism,

445
00:22:20,839 --> 00:22:22,674
known as the quill,

446
00:22:22,741 --> 00:22:25,911
are almost entirely worn away.

447
00:22:25,977 --> 00:22:28,080
Investigators
may finally have the lead

448
00:22:28,146 --> 00:22:29,948
they've been looking for.

449
00:22:30,015 --> 00:22:31,883
Ritter: This is what
it's supposed to look like.

450
00:22:35,287 --> 00:22:37,255
Narrator:
With its teeth worn away,

451
00:22:37,322 --> 00:22:39,324
the quill can't lock
onto the gear system

452
00:22:39,391 --> 00:22:42,661
that controls the angle
of the propeller blades.

453
00:22:43,628 --> 00:22:46,732
The discovery might explain
why the propeller blades

454
00:22:46,798 --> 00:22:50,001
slipped to such
a dangerously low angle.

455
00:22:52,170 --> 00:22:56,007
Ritter: Once we noticed that the
quill teeth were severely worn,

456
00:22:56,074 --> 00:22:58,977
we started theorizing
what would happen

457
00:22:59,044 --> 00:23:01,446
in that type of situation,

458
00:23:01,513 --> 00:23:03,181
and it was pretty clear that

459
00:23:03,248 --> 00:23:07,352
control of the propeller
blade angles could be lost.

460
00:23:07,819 --> 00:23:10,021
And that really was
a eureka moment for us,

461
00:23:10,088 --> 00:23:13,325
because now we had
a serious malfunction

462
00:23:13,391 --> 00:23:16,094
that we could examine.

463
00:23:16,962 --> 00:23:18,830
Ritter: This could

464
00:23:16,962 --> 00:23:18,830
definitely be it.

465
00:23:20,065 --> 00:23:22,167
Narrator: Ritter digs
into manufacturing reports,

466
00:23:22,234 --> 00:23:26,438
trying to find out how such
a vital part could have failed.

467
00:23:26,505 --> 00:23:29,908
But what he finds
only adds to the mystery.

468
00:23:30,742 --> 00:23:32,110
The quill teeth are made

469
00:23:32,177 --> 00:23:35,413
of an extremely durable
case-hardened metal.

470
00:23:35,480 --> 00:23:37,949
Ritter: They were definitely
made to last.

471
00:23:38,016 --> 00:23:40,018
Narrator: It's hard to imagine
what could have caused

472
00:23:40,085 --> 00:23:43,755
such rugged teeth
to wear down so badly.

473
00:23:43,822 --> 00:23:45,557
Ritter: Something
didn't work as planned.

474
00:23:45,624 --> 00:23:48,693
Let's find out everything we can
about every one of these pieces.

475
00:23:49,528 --> 00:23:52,430
Narrator: Ritter is certain
he's found the critical clue--

476
00:23:52,497 --> 00:23:55,534
worn-down teeth on the quill
that could have allowed

477
00:23:55,600 --> 00:23:59,304
the propeller blades to slip
to a dangerous angle.

478
00:24:00,138 --> 00:24:04,009
But he soon learns there's
a big problem with his theory.

479
00:24:04,910 --> 00:24:07,612
The manufacturer says
it's impossible.

480
00:24:08,513 --> 00:24:11,983
Engineers at Hamilton Standard
included a fail-safe feature

481
00:24:12,050 --> 00:24:14,119
when they designed
the propeller.

482
00:24:14,186 --> 00:24:18,790
It should be impossible for the
blades to go flat during flight.

483
00:24:20,058 --> 00:24:22,327
Maris: Manufacturers
have to demonstrate,

484
00:24:22,394 --> 00:24:25,897
through a number of means, that
their systems are fail-safe.

485
00:24:27,098 --> 00:24:28,300
Haueter:
All the tests and research

486
00:24:28,366 --> 00:24:29,835
that had been done
before this said

487
00:24:29,901 --> 00:24:32,270
even if
you have a disconnect,

488
00:24:32,337 --> 00:24:34,873
that will not result
in an accident.

489
00:24:36,975 --> 00:24:38,443
Narrator:
If there's ever a problem

490
00:24:38,510 --> 00:24:40,278
with the mechanism
controlling the angle,

491
00:24:40,345 --> 00:24:42,380
the blades are designed
to move on their own

492
00:24:42,447 --> 00:24:45,383
to what's called
the feathered position.

493
00:24:46,918 --> 00:24:48,553
Haueter:
The feathered propeller blade,

494
00:24:48,620 --> 00:24:52,224
the leading edge of the blade
is directly into the wind,

495
00:24:52,290 --> 00:24:54,226
so that's the most minimal drag,

496
00:24:54,292 --> 00:24:56,895
no thrust,
but very little drag.

497
00:24:56,962 --> 00:24:58,563
Narrator:
A feathered propeller

498
00:24:58,630 --> 00:25:01,666
can't endanger
the safety of the flight.

499
00:25:01,733 --> 00:25:04,502
Maris: If this rod disengaged
because of any cause,

500
00:25:04,569 --> 00:25:06,204
the propeller should
go to feather,

501
00:25:06,271 --> 00:25:08,406
which would result
in the loss of the engine,

502
00:25:08,473 --> 00:25:10,175
and the crew would be able
to cope with that

503
00:25:10,242 --> 00:25:13,245
and land on one engine,
as they are trained to do.

504
00:25:13,311 --> 00:25:15,413
Friedline:
The runway's in sight.

505
00:25:18,283 --> 00:25:20,285
Ritter: This has got to be it.

506
00:25:21,419 --> 00:25:24,289
This has to be
connected somehow.

507
00:25:24,789 --> 00:25:26,124
Narrator: But Ritter
isn't convinced

508
00:25:26,191 --> 00:25:28,660
by the manufacturer's
assurances.

509
00:25:28,727 --> 00:25:32,731
His gut tells him the worn quill
did allow the propeller blades

510
00:25:32,797 --> 00:25:34,933
to move to a dangerous angle.

511
00:25:36,234 --> 00:25:37,969
But without flight data,

512
00:25:38,036 --> 00:25:40,505
his investigation
has hit a wall.

513
00:25:40,572 --> 00:25:44,576
He has no way to prove the quill
brought down flight 2311.

514
00:25:45,777 --> 00:25:47,479
Friedline: What's going on?

515
00:25:47,545 --> 00:25:49,080
Can you see anything?

516
00:25:49,147 --> 00:25:50,949
Johnston: There's nothing.

517
00:25:59,624 --> 00:26:01,893
Ritter:
Tom, welcome to the team.

518
00:26:01,960 --> 00:26:04,062
Haueter: No problem, Jim.
Glad to help.

519
00:26:04,129 --> 00:26:06,798
Narrator:
With the investigation stalled,

520
00:26:06,865 --> 00:26:09,868
Tom Haueter joins Jim Ritter
to hunt for answers

521
00:26:09,935 --> 00:26:13,371
in the crash of
Atlantic Southeast flight 2311.

522
00:26:14,940 --> 00:26:16,741
Haueter: I was a little nervous
about this one

523
00:26:16,808 --> 00:26:18,910
in that when I first
jumped into it,

524
00:26:18,977 --> 00:26:21,780
I didn't really know
what was going on

525
00:26:21,846 --> 00:26:24,716
other than it was basically
at a standstill

526
00:26:24,783 --> 00:26:27,085
and they were looking for me
to get it moving.

527
00:26:27,152 --> 00:26:28,520
What do we have?

528
00:26:28,586 --> 00:26:29,621
Ritter: I think everything
we need to know

529
00:26:29,688 --> 00:26:31,756
is right here on this table.

530
00:26:32,290 --> 00:26:35,727
Haueter: You have a part of
the propeller control assembly,

531
00:26:35,794 --> 00:26:38,630
and the teeth on the gear
are essentially gone.

532
00:26:38,697 --> 00:26:41,032
That's very unusual.

533
00:26:41,099 --> 00:26:43,234
Could that have been
a part of the accident?

534
00:26:43,301 --> 00:26:44,703
We didn't know.

535
00:26:46,137 --> 00:26:48,106
Narrator: Haueter and Ritter
study the design

536
00:26:48,173 --> 00:26:51,142
of the propeller mechanism.

537
00:26:51,209 --> 00:26:53,011
Ritter: Tom, look at this.

538
00:26:53,078 --> 00:26:56,047
Haueter: We don't see anything
obviously wrong with the crew.

539
00:26:56,114 --> 00:26:58,817
We don't see anything wrong with
the structure of the aircraft.

540
00:26:58,883 --> 00:27:00,585
We don't see anything wrong
with the engines

541
00:27:00,652 --> 00:27:02,087
and the flight control system,

542
00:27:02,153 --> 00:27:05,223
but we do have a severely worn
Transfer Tube

543
00:27:05,290 --> 00:27:06,925
and quill arrangement.

544
00:27:07,659 --> 00:27:11,429
Is it possible that this
could have resulted

545
00:27:11,496 --> 00:27:13,465
in the loss of control?

546
00:27:13,531 --> 00:27:16,334
Narrator: They discover that
shortly before the accident,

547
00:27:16,401 --> 00:27:19,971
Hamilton Standard started using
a harder, more abrasive coating

548
00:27:20,038 --> 00:27:23,074
on a key part known
as the Transfer Tube.

549
00:27:24,275 --> 00:27:28,780
Its grooves mesh-like clockwork
into the teeth of the quill.

550
00:27:28,847 --> 00:27:32,584
The change had
an unexpected consequence.

551
00:27:32,650 --> 00:27:34,452
Haueter: It turned it
into a giant file.

552
00:27:35,754 --> 00:27:38,056
Ritter: So the splines
on the Transfer Tube

553
00:27:38,123 --> 00:27:41,493
were much harder and rougher
than the quill teeth,

554
00:27:41,559 --> 00:27:43,228
and it was almost
like sandpaper,

555
00:27:43,294 --> 00:27:44,596
so the tube was actually

556
00:27:44,662 --> 00:27:46,731
wearing down
the teeth on the quill.

557
00:27:47,799 --> 00:27:51,202
Narrator: The discovery explains
the worn teeth on the quill.

558
00:27:54,639 --> 00:27:57,208
The design of the propeller
should ensure

559
00:27:57,275 --> 00:27:59,611
it snaps to a safe position,

560
00:27:59,677 --> 00:28:01,579
even with the worn part.

561
00:28:02,914 --> 00:28:06,051
Ritter: The propeller
manufacturer believed

562
00:28:06,117 --> 00:28:08,386
that they had
a fail-safe condition,

563
00:28:08,453 --> 00:28:10,188
so that even if they had
this problem,

564
00:28:10,255 --> 00:28:13,191
the propeller blades
would be slowly driven

565
00:28:13,258 --> 00:28:14,926
to the feather position.

566
00:28:16,928 --> 00:28:19,164
Narrator: In spite of what
all their data says,

567
00:28:19,230 --> 00:28:22,200
the investigators want
to see for themselves.

568
00:28:26,805 --> 00:28:29,808
They set up a test at
the manufacturer's facility.

569
00:28:32,077 --> 00:28:35,513
Ritter: We had an engine
and a propeller combination

570
00:28:35,580 --> 00:28:37,582
mounted in a test cell.

571
00:28:39,918 --> 00:28:42,320
Maris: In order to determine
that something is fail-safe,

572
00:28:42,387 --> 00:28:45,457
the engineers use a combination
of mathematical analysis,

573
00:28:45,523 --> 00:28:47,258
very structured analysis,

574
00:28:47,325 --> 00:28:50,261
testing in a laboratory,
as you can imagine,

575
00:28:50,328 --> 00:28:51,663
and by these methods,

576
00:28:51,729 --> 00:28:53,331
Hamilton Standard
convinced themselves

577
00:28:53,398 --> 00:28:56,434
that this propeller would fail
in a safe direction,

578
00:28:56,501 --> 00:28:57,902
i.e., towards feather.

579
00:29:03,942 --> 00:29:06,978
Narrator: Jim Ritter's doubts
about the fail-safe design

580
00:29:07,045 --> 00:29:10,115
may be confirmed
in just a few seconds.

581
00:29:12,183 --> 00:29:14,752
The technician flips a switch
to free the Transfer Tube

582
00:29:14,819 --> 00:29:16,754
from the teeth on the quill.

583
00:29:19,390 --> 00:29:23,328
But as the test unfolds,
instead of moving to flat,

584
00:29:23,394 --> 00:29:26,397
the propeller blades move to
the safe feathered position.

585
00:29:27,298 --> 00:29:31,169
The fail-safe system performs
exactly as it was designed to.

586
00:29:34,272 --> 00:29:36,241
It suddenly seems
that investigators

587
00:29:36,307 --> 00:29:38,877
are on the wrong path
altogether.

588
00:29:40,411 --> 00:29:43,715
Ritter: So, when we tested
the quill with the worn teeth

589
00:29:43,781 --> 00:29:46,317
at the manufacturer's facility,

590
00:29:46,384 --> 00:29:49,254
we found that the propeller
blades went to feather,

591
00:29:49,320 --> 00:29:53,758
so at that point,
we were basically stumped.

592
00:29:53,825 --> 00:29:55,293
Haueter: Can you play it again?

593
00:29:58,530 --> 00:30:02,133
Narrator: The test results leave
Ritter and Haueter wondering,

594
00:30:02,200 --> 00:30:05,203
could there be some other factor
that they've overlooked?

595
00:30:06,905 --> 00:30:08,606
Haueter: Hold on.

596
00:30:09,274 --> 00:30:10,842
That's it.

597
00:30:10,909 --> 00:30:13,344
It's bolted to the ground.

598
00:30:13,411 --> 00:30:14,913
The question I raised,

599
00:30:14,979 --> 00:30:17,916
well, in flight, the aircraft
is in turbulence,

600
00:30:17,982 --> 00:30:19,350
it's bouncing around.

601
00:30:19,417 --> 00:30:21,052
There's different vibrations.

602
00:30:21,119 --> 00:30:22,754
With the aircraft on the ground

603
00:30:22,820 --> 00:30:25,123
or an engine mounted solidly
to the ground,

604
00:30:25,190 --> 00:30:26,824
the airplane doesn't
behave the same.

605
00:30:26,891 --> 00:30:29,160
There's different
vibration modes.

606
00:30:29,227 --> 00:30:33,464
Is it possible that could change
the outcome of the analysis?

607
00:30:34,032 --> 00:30:35,700
Haueter: I think we need
to see it in the air.

608
00:30:35,767 --> 00:30:38,269
Ritter: Definitely.

609
00:30:38,336 --> 00:30:40,572
Maris: One of the problems
with doing testing

610
00:30:40,638 --> 00:30:43,308
in a laboratory environment,
which is very controlled,

611
00:30:43,374 --> 00:30:45,677
is that you can't always
anticipate what will happen

612
00:30:45,743 --> 00:30:48,179
when you go out
into the real world.

613
00:30:51,449 --> 00:30:54,185
Carter: These small planes
do keep you on your toes.

614
00:30:54,252 --> 00:30:57,355
Maris: Imagine, for example,
an orchestra that rehearses

615
00:30:57,422 --> 00:31:00,258
in an acoustically perfect
concert hall

616
00:31:00,325 --> 00:31:04,362
and then performs outside
with random noises,

617
00:31:04,429 --> 00:31:06,164
without the sound controlled.

618
00:31:06,231 --> 00:31:09,701
You can see how one might miss
important factors

619
00:31:09,767 --> 00:31:11,302
about the sound.

620
00:31:11,369 --> 00:31:14,172
Haueter: We've got to see
what happens in the air.

621
00:31:14,239 --> 00:31:17,008
I said, "Well, the only way
to really know

622
00:31:17,075 --> 00:31:19,010
is let's do a flight test
and find out."

623
00:31:19,077 --> 00:31:22,547
Let's do something to absolutely
determine this is the case,

624
00:31:22,614 --> 00:31:24,682
'cause we were at a point
in the investigation

625
00:31:24,749 --> 00:31:27,385
we need to start
eliminating things.

626
00:31:33,291 --> 00:31:37,161
Narrator: The investigation
into the crash of flight 2311

627
00:31:37,228 --> 00:31:39,764
moves to Embraer headquarters
in Brazil.

628
00:31:41,065 --> 00:31:42,567
Ritter:
We really wanted to look at

629
00:31:42,634 --> 00:31:45,903
what would happen in flight,
in an actual flight

630
00:31:45,970 --> 00:31:47,372
with the same malfunction?

631
00:31:49,274 --> 00:31:52,410
Narrator: Tom Haueter meets with
representatives from Embraer

632
00:31:52,477 --> 00:31:54,846
and propeller manufacturer
Hamilton Standard.

633
00:31:56,080 --> 00:31:59,617
The team immediately starts
preparing for the test flight.

634
00:32:00,118 --> 00:32:02,553
Haueter: Thank you
for doing this.

635
00:32:02,620 --> 00:32:05,256
When I first proposed
doing the flight test,

636
00:32:05,323 --> 00:32:08,760
it was not well-received
by almost everybody.

637
00:32:08,826 --> 00:32:10,828
People saw no need.

638
00:32:10,895 --> 00:32:12,597
Why are we spending the time,
the money?

639
00:32:12,664 --> 00:32:14,232
Why are we doing this?

640
00:32:14,732 --> 00:32:16,334
Would you mind if
I used that table?

641
00:32:16,401 --> 00:32:17,568
Is that okay?

642
00:32:17,635 --> 00:32:19,237
But I pushed hard.

643
00:32:19,304 --> 00:32:22,674
I thought, "Well, we need
to really prove this."

644
00:32:22,740 --> 00:32:25,977
Narrator: Embraer's chief
test pilot, Gilberto Schittini,

645
00:32:26,044 --> 00:32:27,612
has agreed to put
the investigators' theory

646
00:32:27,679 --> 00:32:29,213
to the test.

647
00:32:30,315 --> 00:32:34,085
Gilberto Schittini: The risks,
of course, is part of the game,

648
00:32:34,152 --> 00:32:36,587
so you have, always have
to reduce your risk

649
00:32:36,654 --> 00:32:38,056
as much as possible,

650
00:32:38,122 --> 00:32:41,225
but you cannot avoid it,
so you just accept it.

651
00:32:43,261 --> 00:32:46,464
Maris: The mindset
of a test pilot is one

652
00:32:46,531 --> 00:32:48,333
not perhaps of heroic bravery,

653
00:32:48,399 --> 00:32:51,936
but certainly one wants
to be unflappable

654
00:32:52,003 --> 00:32:55,640
in the face of danger
and unusual situations,

655
00:32:55,707 --> 00:32:58,142
because you're not
very productive

656
00:32:58,209 --> 00:33:01,546
if you're terrified by
the goings-on in the cockpit.

657
00:33:03,348 --> 00:33:05,983
Narrator: Schittini
will fly an Embraer 120

658
00:33:06,050 --> 00:33:09,487
that has been modified
to recreate the failure

659
00:33:09,554 --> 00:33:11,756
on flight 2311.

660
00:33:11,823 --> 00:33:13,725
Haueter:
So, we've modified the quill.

661
00:33:13,791 --> 00:33:17,095
The teeth have been worn down
just like flight 2311.

662
00:33:18,296 --> 00:33:19,931
Narrator: A worn quill
will be placed

663
00:33:19,997 --> 00:33:23,234
inside the propeller unit.

664
00:33:23,301 --> 00:33:25,703
Haueter: This was potentially
very high risk,

665
00:33:25,770 --> 00:33:29,140
because once we disconnected
the Transfer Tube in flight,

666
00:33:29,207 --> 00:33:31,476
the pilots would have no way
to control the propeller.

667
00:33:32,510 --> 00:33:34,979
We put a pitch lock here.

668
00:33:35,046 --> 00:33:36,748
It won't go past 22 degrees.

669
00:33:37,749 --> 00:33:39,984
Narrator: A mechanical lock
has also been added

670
00:33:40,051 --> 00:33:43,855
to stop the propeller from going
flatter than 22 degrees.

671
00:33:44,756 --> 00:33:47,191
Haueter: It would be too
dangerous in the flight test

672
00:33:47,258 --> 00:33:50,161
to have the propeller blade
go all the way to flat pitch.

673
00:33:50,228 --> 00:33:51,662
You'd lose control
of the airplane.

674
00:33:51,729 --> 00:33:53,798
That was almost guaranteed.

675
00:33:53,865 --> 00:33:56,100
If the blades move
to 22 degrees,

676
00:33:56,167 --> 00:33:58,302
then we know that they would
have gone flat.

677
00:33:58,369 --> 00:33:59,871
All good?

678
00:33:59,937 --> 00:34:03,141
Narrator: The propeller blades
don't need to go completely flat

679
00:34:03,207 --> 00:34:05,810
to prove that Haueter's
on the right track.

680
00:34:05,877 --> 00:34:08,713
Schittini:
This was a high-risk test.

681
00:34:08,780 --> 00:34:11,783
We had to take extra precautions

682
00:34:11,849 --> 00:34:14,585
in order
not to repeat the accident.

683
00:34:15,820 --> 00:34:18,623
Narrator: Real-time data will
tell the team on the ground

684
00:34:18,689 --> 00:34:21,726
whether the propeller blades are
going safely towards feather

685
00:34:21,793 --> 00:34:24,395
or moving dangerously flat.

686
00:34:24,462 --> 00:34:27,031
Haueter: Everything says that
if you have a disconnect,

687
00:34:27,098 --> 00:34:29,834
the normal frictional drag
within the system

688
00:34:29,901 --> 00:34:31,969
will cause
the components to rotate

689
00:34:32,036 --> 00:34:34,372
towards the feather position,

690
00:34:34,439 --> 00:34:37,575
but will that really happen
in flight the same way?

691
00:34:40,111 --> 00:34:42,447
Narrator:
They're about to find out.

692
00:34:43,214 --> 00:34:45,783
Haueter: We were comfortable
that this test

693
00:34:45,850 --> 00:34:47,752
could be safely accomplished,

694
00:34:47,819 --> 00:34:49,353
but there's a difference

695
00:34:49,420 --> 00:34:51,355
between believing
it can be safely accomplished

696
00:34:51,422 --> 00:34:52,890
and knowing.

697
00:34:55,193 --> 00:34:57,261
Narrator:
As the test plane climbs,

698
00:34:57,328 --> 00:34:59,864
Schittini takes it
over an unpopulated area,

699
00:34:59,931 --> 00:35:01,399
just in case.

700
00:35:02,700 --> 00:35:04,068
Haueter: There was a potential

701
00:35:04,135 --> 00:35:07,705
for a severe
controllability problem

702
00:35:07,772 --> 00:35:10,341
such that the pilots might
have to abandon the aircraft

703
00:35:10,408 --> 00:35:12,243
and parachute to the ground.

704
00:35:13,578 --> 00:35:15,313
Narrator: The propellers
have been set

705
00:35:15,379 --> 00:35:17,482
to a normal angle for flight--

706
00:35:17,548 --> 00:35:19,217
around 30 degrees.

707
00:35:20,184 --> 00:35:22,353
Haueter: EMB-120, do you copy?

708
00:35:22,420 --> 00:35:25,256
There was a lot on the line,
in terms of the fact

709
00:35:25,323 --> 00:35:27,225
that what if this
airplane crashes?

710
00:35:27,792 --> 00:35:29,427
What if we lose the airplane?

711
00:35:30,394 --> 00:35:32,897
Certainly
I'm the investigator in charge.

712
00:35:32,964 --> 00:35:35,500
I'm the one, you know, who's
basically running this test.

713
00:35:35,566 --> 00:35:38,369
This could be all
my responsibility.

714
00:35:38,436 --> 00:35:39,570
Schittini: Copy.

715
00:35:39,637 --> 00:35:42,006
We are ready to disengage
the prop.

716
00:35:43,341 --> 00:35:45,676
Haueter: Basically they would
pull the lever

717
00:35:45,743 --> 00:35:48,980
that would disconnect
the propeller control system

718
00:35:49,046 --> 00:35:50,648
from the propeller

719
00:35:50,715 --> 00:35:52,450
and see what happens.

720
00:35:54,519 --> 00:35:56,587
Narrator: The most dangerous
part of the test flight

721
00:35:56,654 --> 00:35:58,422
is now under way.

722
00:35:59,957 --> 00:36:03,794
Schittini: I just thought that,
well, it's happening.

723
00:36:03,861 --> 00:36:07,498
Let's do what we have to do and
get this airplane on the ground.

724
00:36:07,999 --> 00:36:11,469
Maris: This was, in my opinion
a very dangerous maneuver,

725
00:36:11,536 --> 00:36:12,837
because after all,
they didn't know

726
00:36:12,904 --> 00:36:14,438
what the outcome
was going to be,

727
00:36:14,505 --> 00:36:16,674
and they already knew
the aircraft wasn't controllable

728
00:36:16,741 --> 00:36:18,809
under certain circumstances.

729
00:36:18,876 --> 00:36:21,979
Schittini: Propeller blade angle
is causing no problems.

730
00:36:22,046 --> 00:36:24,181
No control issues.

731
00:36:24,982 --> 00:36:28,953
We were thinking about
the test to do and nothing else.

732
00:36:29,020 --> 00:36:33,224
You have to focus on the job
that you have to do ahead,

733
00:36:33,291 --> 00:36:36,761
and once you focus you forget
about everything else.

734
00:36:38,429 --> 00:36:41,232
Narrator: As soon as the
propeller quill is disengaged,

735
00:36:41,299 --> 00:36:44,368
the blades begin doing what
they were designed to do--

736
00:36:44,435 --> 00:36:46,737
moving towards
the feathered position.

737
00:36:47,805 --> 00:36:50,508
Haueter: As it starts
drifting towards feather,

738
00:36:50,575 --> 00:36:51,609
we thought, "Okay.

739
00:36:51,676 --> 00:36:53,444
Well, this test is
gonna be a bust.

740
00:36:53,511 --> 00:36:55,479
It's just gonna prove what
everybody said it would do."

741
00:36:56,781 --> 00:36:57,782
You could see it in their faces.

742
00:36:57,848 --> 00:36:59,483
They didn't say anything,

743
00:36:59,550 --> 00:37:02,453
but you could just, you know,
hear the relief.

744
00:37:02,520 --> 00:37:04,288
Narrator: The propeller blades
keep moving

745
00:37:04,355 --> 00:37:06,991
toward the fail-safe position.

746
00:37:07,425 --> 00:37:11,429
For Tom Haueter, Brazil is
a long way to come for failure.

747
00:37:13,064 --> 00:37:14,799
It seems like the test

748
00:37:14,865 --> 00:37:18,135
that he hoped would solve
the mystery of flight 2311

749
00:37:18,202 --> 00:37:19,971
is going to leave
the investigation

750
00:37:20,037 --> 00:37:21,806
back at square one.

751
00:37:29,847 --> 00:37:32,450
Narrator: With the cause
of the Atlantic Southeast crash

752
00:37:32,516 --> 00:37:33,884
still unknown

753
00:37:33,951 --> 00:37:36,320
and the entire investigation
on the line,

754
00:37:36,387 --> 00:37:39,423
the Brazilian test flight
takes a dramatic turn.

755
00:37:40,491 --> 00:37:44,195
Schittini: We saw that
the RPM was increasing slowly,

756
00:37:44,261 --> 00:37:46,697
but it was increasing,
so we knew that the propeller

757
00:37:46,764 --> 00:37:49,734
was going in
the wrong direction.

758
00:37:52,603 --> 00:37:54,305
Narrator:
As the flight continues,

759
00:37:54,372 --> 00:37:57,308
the blades begin drifting
in the opposite direction,

760
00:37:57,375 --> 00:38:00,211
towards the dangerous
flat position.

761
00:38:03,614 --> 00:38:05,116
Haueter: Ah-ha.

762
00:38:06,417 --> 00:38:07,752
Here we go.

763
00:38:09,987 --> 00:38:12,356
Ritter: The aerodynamics,
the vibration,

764
00:38:12,423 --> 00:38:15,926
the actual in-flight loads
on the propeller

765
00:38:15,993 --> 00:38:19,296
are something that you just
can't predict in a test.

766
00:38:19,363 --> 00:38:22,033
It's something that actually
had to be flown.

767
00:38:24,001 --> 00:38:26,203
Narrator: Schittini remains
smooth and precise

768
00:38:26,270 --> 00:38:28,372
on the controls.

769
00:38:28,439 --> 00:38:30,141
Schittini: Reducing speed.

770
00:38:31,475 --> 00:38:34,178
Easy does it.

771
00:38:37,148 --> 00:38:40,384
We started feeling
a rolling moment to the left

772
00:38:40,451 --> 00:38:43,287
and a yaw moment to the left.

773
00:38:44,422 --> 00:38:48,159
Narrator: The blades go as flat
as this test will allow,

774
00:38:48,225 --> 00:38:50,061
22 degrees.

775
00:38:50,127 --> 00:38:53,197
For Haueter, it's a victory.

776
00:38:53,264 --> 00:38:55,866
The risky test flight
has paid off.

777
00:38:55,933 --> 00:38:59,003
His theory about the crash
is back on solid ground.

778
00:38:59,070 --> 00:39:02,173
Haueter: The Hamilton Standard
and the FA people

779
00:39:02,239 --> 00:39:03,407
just went white.

780
00:39:03,474 --> 00:39:04,875
I mean, they were just shocked.

781
00:39:04,942 --> 00:39:06,210
You could tell that
everything they believed

782
00:39:06,277 --> 00:39:08,913
had just been thrown
out the window.

783
00:39:10,715 --> 00:39:12,783
That's as flat as
they're gonna get.

784
00:39:15,052 --> 00:39:17,521
Schittini: Do you have
what you need?

785
00:39:17,588 --> 00:39:18,823
Haueter: Affirmative.

786
00:39:18,889 --> 00:39:20,458
We have everything we need.

787
00:39:22,693 --> 00:39:25,463
Schittini:
Okay, we're going back.

788
00:39:30,201 --> 00:39:33,304
Once the test part is finished,
it is finished.

789
00:39:33,370 --> 00:39:35,673
Don't stay around
looking for trouble.

790
00:39:35,740 --> 00:39:37,208
Go back home.

791
00:39:38,743 --> 00:39:39,844
Haueter: Good work.

792
00:39:39,910 --> 00:39:41,412
Thanks very much.

793
00:39:41,479 --> 00:39:43,013
Seeing the data right then,
it took a load off.

794
00:39:43,080 --> 00:39:44,815
I said, "Okay, wow."

795
00:39:44,882 --> 00:39:46,917
I mean, we now know
what happened.

796
00:39:46,984 --> 00:39:49,019
It was obvious.

797
00:39:49,086 --> 00:39:51,388
Looks like you have
some work to do.

798
00:39:58,562 --> 00:39:59,864
Ritter: Hello.

799
00:40:00,831 --> 00:40:03,267
Narrator: The team has just
one more question to answer

800
00:40:03,334 --> 00:40:05,803
before they can explain
the crash.

801
00:40:06,470 --> 00:40:10,207
What happens when blades
go completely flat?

802
00:40:10,274 --> 00:40:11,675
Ritter: In the flight test,

803
00:40:11,742 --> 00:40:13,110
they were only able to go

804
00:40:13,177 --> 00:40:15,513
to a blade angle
of about 22 degrees

805
00:40:15,579 --> 00:40:16,914
for safety reasons.

806
00:40:16,981 --> 00:40:18,682
Start it.

807
00:40:18,749 --> 00:40:21,385
But during
my flight simulations,

808
00:40:21,452 --> 00:40:25,422
I went down to flight angles
as low as three degrees.

809
00:40:25,489 --> 00:40:28,058
Anytime.

810
00:40:28,626 --> 00:40:30,261
Narrator: In a flight simulator,

811
00:40:30,327 --> 00:40:33,063
Jim Ritter recreates
the fatal propeller malfunction

812
00:40:33,130 --> 00:40:38,169
aboard Atlantic Southeast
Airlines flight 2311.

813
00:40:38,235 --> 00:40:42,072
Ritter: As the blade angle
got to very low values,

814
00:40:42,139 --> 00:40:45,276
the airplane was essentially
uncontrollable.

815
00:40:46,977 --> 00:40:49,079
Narrator: The simulation
allows him to experience

816
00:40:49,146 --> 00:40:51,248
what the test pilot couldn't.

817
00:40:53,684 --> 00:40:55,052
Haueter: Flight tests proved

818
00:40:55,119 --> 00:40:57,021
we could have a blade
go to flat pitch.

819
00:40:57,087 --> 00:40:59,423
The simulator proved
you'd lose control if it did.

820
00:41:00,090 --> 00:41:01,458
Ritter: Thanks.

821
00:41:01,525 --> 00:41:03,828
That was... helpful.

822
00:41:03,894 --> 00:41:06,230
You could say that
the simulator testing

823
00:41:06,297 --> 00:41:09,600
was kind of like the final
piece of the puzzle.

824
00:41:11,669 --> 00:41:14,405
Narrator: Investigators finally
understand the full story

825
00:41:14,471 --> 00:41:16,841
behind the deadly crash.

826
00:41:17,741 --> 00:41:20,344
Ritter: When the flight crew
began preparations for landing,

827
00:41:20,411 --> 00:41:22,847
the teeth on the quill
were worn down,

828
00:41:22,913 --> 00:41:25,149
but still operational.

829
00:41:25,216 --> 00:41:27,318
Friedline:
Slowing for approach speed.

830
00:41:28,385 --> 00:41:30,888
Narrator: Preparing for landing
put renewed pressure

831
00:41:30,955 --> 00:41:33,757
on the already worn teeth
in the quill.

832
00:41:33,824 --> 00:41:36,126
They could no longer hold.

833
00:41:37,228 --> 00:41:38,929
Once the teeth gave way,

834
00:41:39,496 --> 00:41:43,200
the propeller blades were free
to drift to a different angle.

835
00:41:44,935 --> 00:41:46,270
As the turbulence of flight

836
00:41:46,337 --> 00:41:48,839
and mechanical vibrations
from the engine

837
00:41:48,906 --> 00:41:50,674
shook the propeller,

838
00:41:50,741 --> 00:41:54,044
the blades moved to
a dangerously flat position.

839
00:41:56,380 --> 00:41:59,884
Ritter: The fail-safe failed.

840
00:42:00,618 --> 00:42:04,255
The propeller's design couldn't
hold the blades at a safe angle,

841
00:42:04,321 --> 00:42:06,423
and the plane became less
and less controllable.

842
00:42:09,627 --> 00:42:12,029
Friedline: What's going on?

843
00:42:12,096 --> 00:42:13,397
You see anything?

844
00:42:14,298 --> 00:42:16,433
Johnston: There's nothing.

845
00:42:16,500 --> 00:42:17,668
Friedline: What's going on
with this thing?

846
00:42:17,735 --> 00:42:19,436
I can't hold it.

847
00:42:23,007 --> 00:42:24,341
Johnston: Get out of it!

848
00:42:24,408 --> 00:42:26,176
Friedline: I can't.
Come on. Come on!

849
00:42:26,243 --> 00:42:28,746
Haueter: For a while,
you can kind of fight this,

850
00:42:28,812 --> 00:42:32,016
putting in control movements
with the wheels, the rudder,

851
00:42:32,082 --> 00:42:34,885
but, unfortunately,
they were in a situation

852
00:42:34,952 --> 00:42:36,453
where it didn't matter

853
00:42:36,520 --> 00:42:38,622
if you were the best pilot
on the planet.

854
00:42:38,689 --> 00:42:40,557
You were not going to be able
to control that airplane.

855
00:42:40,624 --> 00:42:42,059
It's going to roll over.

856
00:42:42,126 --> 00:42:44,028
It's gonna dive
towards the ground.

857
00:42:45,763 --> 00:42:49,333
Maris: Ironically, human error
is almost always underneath

858
00:42:49,400 --> 00:42:51,435
the causes of an accident,

859
00:42:51,502 --> 00:42:54,338
even if it wasn't the pilot
or a mechanic.

860
00:42:54,405 --> 00:42:57,174
In this particular case,
an engineering change was made,

861
00:42:57,241 --> 00:43:00,411
which, well-intentioned,
actually, did not work out.

862
00:43:00,477 --> 00:43:01,512
Johnston: No!

863
00:43:01,578 --> 00:43:03,113
Friedline:
That's it. Oh, God!

864
00:43:04,782 --> 00:43:06,550
Johnston: No.

865
00:43:10,387 --> 00:43:11,889
Haueter: The worn quill teeth

866
00:43:11,956 --> 00:43:13,424
was a time bomb
waiting to go off.

867
00:43:15,592 --> 00:43:19,296
There was nothing they could
have done to save that plane.

868
00:43:19,363 --> 00:43:22,166
What I really felt was, "Okay,
now that we know it,

869
00:43:22,232 --> 00:43:24,268
we've got to tell
the rest of the world

870
00:43:24,335 --> 00:43:26,236
and get operators to start
changing their equipment,

871
00:43:26,303 --> 00:43:28,238
like, right now."

872
00:43:28,305 --> 00:43:30,341
The fail-safe system
doesn't work.

873
00:43:31,008 --> 00:43:34,244
Narrator: After the accident,
additional safeguards were added

874
00:43:34,311 --> 00:43:37,181
to prevent this
type of failure--

875
00:43:37,247 --> 00:43:39,583
a change that affected
not only the Embraer,

876
00:43:39,650 --> 00:43:43,087
but several other
turboprop aircraft as well.

877
00:43:43,153 --> 00:43:46,924
The FAA also ordered
more frequent inspections

878
00:43:46,991 --> 00:43:48,525
of propeller quills.

879
00:43:48,592 --> 00:43:50,427
Haueter: The most important
thing we have learned

880
00:43:50,494 --> 00:43:53,163
from the accident at Brunswick

881
00:43:53,230 --> 00:43:55,432
is assumptions.

882
00:43:55,499 --> 00:43:57,401
You cannot rely on assumptions.

883
00:43:57,468 --> 00:44:00,704
It was assumed that ground tests
were as good as flight tests.

884
00:44:00,771 --> 00:44:03,307
That one assumption
unfortunately turned out

885
00:44:03,374 --> 00:44:05,342
to be fatal for some people.


